In recent years, female marriage migration from China and Southeast Asia has significantly increased the number of foreign-born citizens in Taiwan. This article is a preliminary investigation into how political parties responded to the growing multicultural makeup of the national community between 2000 and 2012. We examine the content of the Understanding Taiwan textbook, the election publicity of the two major political parties, citizenship legislation, and the results of interviewing immigrant women. The findings show that the change in the ruling party did make differences in terms of both parties' projection of immigrant women in election propaganda and citizenship legislation. However, inward-looking multiculturalism is practised by the two main political parties in Taiwan to forge national identity and enhance national cohesion rather than to promote the recognition of immigrants' different cultural heritage.
Introduction
In recent decades, Taiwan has become a major destination for marriage migration in East Asia. As of February 2014, a total of 488,342 men and women from Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, the People's Republic of China (PRC, including Hong Kong and Macau) and other foreign countries were residing in Taiwan as the spouses of citizens of the Republic of China (ROC) (NIA 2014) . Of these, 220,761 have been granted citizenship and have therefore become eligible to vote in elections in Taiwan (NIA 2014) . Ninety-seven per cent of the new citizens are women (NIA 2014) . These new citizens represent one per cent of the entire electorate as of January 2012 (CEC 2014) and have contributed towards the creation of a more diverse ethnic and cultural makeup of the national community. Given that the country's integration policies are aimed at incorporating these individuals into the national community, these policies have become a test of Taiwan's claim to uphold the values of multiculturalism enshrined in the ROC Constitution.
At the same time as increasing diversity within the citizenry, Taiwan has also experienced significant political changes. In 2000 and 2008, there were smooth transfers of ruling parties as a result of presidential elections. Such electoral changes in ruling parties are critical when we consider that democracy theorist Samuel Huntington (1991) regards two successful electoral turnovers as a mark of a consolidated democracy. Since 2000, the literature on Taiwan's democracy has shifted from trying to explain how Taiwan democratised to evaluating the quality of its democracy (Rigger 2005) . Key issues have been whether the current situation can be viewed as a consolidated democracy, how to assess the quality of its democracy, and potential solutions to the remaining democratic challenges. One such challenge is how the political parties integrate the growing community of immigrants and create a welcoming environment for these new citizens (Fell 2011: 239) . Given that the great majority of foreign-born citizens are women of diverse ethnicity and varying nationalities, at the centre of the challenge is the question of how the political parties incorporate the notions of gender, ethnicity and nationality into their multiculturalism discourse and whether they implement the professed policies being put forward.
To answer this critical question, we present a preliminary investigation of how the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuo-mintang (KMT, Guomindang), as the ruling parties during 2000-2008 and 2008-2012 , respectively, rose to this challenge. In so doing, we are attempting to build upon an earlier project that examined the impact of changes in ruling parties by comparing continuity and change from the KMT to the DPP administrations (Fell, Klöter, and Chang 2006) . Like Fell, Klöter, and Chang (2006) , we are interested in analysing patterns of continuity and change after Taiwan's changes in ruling parties. Their study considered the impact of new ruling parties on a range of policy issues, whereas our focus is on immigration. Whether elections really make a difference in terms of policy outcomes is a central question for comparative political science. Since the terrorist attacks of September 2011, multiculturalism has become one of the most divisive and salient political issues in Europe (Fanning 2011: 2) . Therefore, in the present study we are interested to see whether the changes in ruling parties have also impacted how Taiwan deals with its immigrant community. Our hypothesis is that, faced with the increasing number of foreign-born citizens and under the normative multiculturalist national narrative jointly constructed by both parties, both parties would promote multiculturalism values in their policy pronouncements. Therefore, our central question is whether these values professed in the parties' election publicity are realised in their eventual law-making.
Research on marriage immigration in Taiwan has been largely conducted from sociological perspectives rather than political ones (Wang and Bélanger 2008: 102-103) . Women who immigrate because of marriage tend to be perceived as vicitms of "commodified marriage" (Wang and Chang 2002) , human trafficking and domestic abuse, rather than as citizens who can exercise their citizenship (Ito 2005: 52) . The present paper is a preliminary attempt to examine how the two political parties reacted to marriage migration in the context of multiculturalism and how immigrant women responded to the multiculturalism discourse and public policy. Our research questions are as follows:
How is marriage migration projected in the two parties' election campaign propaganda?
How does the immigration legislation that is promulgated and implemented by the two main parties incorporate immigrant women into the national community?
How do immigrant women critique the multiculturalism discourse and, derived from their critiques, how do they perceive themselves in relation to the host society?
Our underlining interest is in whether values of multiculturalism, which are enshrined in the ROC Constitution, are reflected in the election campaigns and legal provisions. More importantly, in direct contrast to this top-down approach, we will take a bottom-up approach to find out how immigrant women, the subjects of multiculturalism, react to the multiculturalism discourse.
Our empirical examination of whether the changes in ruling party in 2000 and 2008 make a difference arises from the use of four different sources. Firstly, we will consider the content of the Understanding Taiwan ( , renshi Taiwan) textbooks to be an official and authoritative signifier of the normative values embraced by the ruling party. Accordingly, we will examine the text published by the KMT government in 1997 and the one revised by the DPP government in February 2008. The KMT version demonstrates that multiculturalism is a defining feature of the national narrative that constructs the island nation; the DPP version shows the inclusion of marriage immigrant women in the expanded national community. Secondly, we will review the two parties' election publicity, including party resolution, manifestos and TV advertisements. Our goal is to find out whether and how the parties incorporate multiculturalism in their election campaigns. Thirdly, we will analyse the citizenship legislation adopted by the DPP (2000 DPP ( -2008 and KMT governments (2008 KMT governments ( -2012 . Our focus is on whether multiculturalism is embedded within the legislation and whether the election propaganda is realised by actual lawmaking. Our last empirical insight is gained from interviews with Chinese and Vietnamese women, who are presented using pseudonyms, both to protect their identity and to delineate research findings. These interview results are drawn from a study of 39 Chinese, 26 Vietnamese and 13 Filipino women conducted in March-June 2009 and January 2010 in urban and rural areas across Taiwan (Cheng 2012) . Triangulating the political parties' election campaign and lawmaking record, these interviews will show how immigrant women make a personal link to the grand multiculturalism narrative, whether they see differences made by the change of ruling parties, and how they perceive themselves in relation to the host society. Our findings suggest that the change of ruling party did make a difference in terms of how the two parties portray immigrant women in election propaganda and citizenship legislation. However, multiculturalism, as practised and understood in Taiwan, was used by the KMT and DPP to strengthen citizens' national identity, regardless of whether the citizens concerned are local or from outside.
Multiculturalism: Descriptive Reality and Normative Policy
There are a variety of ways to conceptualise multiculturalism. It can be descriptive when referring to the empirical reality that a plurality of ethnicity, values, beliefs, faiths, sexuality, or ways of life co-exists amongst the population (Parekh 2006: 6) . It can be taken normatively when advocating respect, recognition or preservation of non-mainstream or minority's cultures, values, faiths, or ways of life. In this light, multiculturalism is a moral theory about human rights and, when stressing the collective cultural rights of marginalised groups, it is a political ideology that challenges liberal concepts of individual rights (Voyer 2011 (Voyer : 1875 . It can be a public policy when the ideal of recognition is implemented by government agencies in education, media, housing, welfare, and other social policies in order to actively engage with heterogeneity (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008: 159) . In contrast to this top-down and macro perspective that is derived from the concept of nation-state, multiculturalism is also utilised as a perspective with which to explore how cultural differences are experienced and engaged in everyday life (Wise and Velayutham 2009: 2) . Fundamental to its liberal (Kymplica 1995; Levey 2010) and communitarian (Taylor 1994; Miller 2000) strands, multiculturalism as a normative public policy aims to cultivate members of the society to gain the capacity to appreciate, recognise and respect diversity, while, in the public sphere, the state ensures the equality of human rights enjoyed by members of the society. Multiculturalism encourages a positive attitude that treats difference with equality, and sees differences as a celebratory element to the general well-being of the national community. As such, multiculturalism is at the juncture with the state's nation-building project. Embedded within the nationstate, multiculturalism policies aim to utilise policy tools to promote a national cohesion that grows out of the recognition of the legitimacy of subscribing to different values or adopting different ways of life.
Immigration is a channel with which to bring diversity into a national community. Consequently, it brings into being a multicultural national community in the descriptive sense. In this article, multiculturalism as understood and practised in Taiwan is descriptive as well as normative. In terms of ethnicity, its descriptive meaning refers to the plural ethnic composition of the national community. Its normative meaning refers to the national narrative that constructs the formation of the national community. The normative element is also found in public policy, which, in accordance with the national narrative, promotes national cohesion and strengthens national identity.
As mentioned above, female marriage migration is the major channel with which to bring in new members of diverse ethnicities and varying nationalities to the national community. Thus, the dual meaning of multiculturalism that Taiwan subscribes to has to be further scrutinised for its elasticity in relation to the concepts of gender, ethnicity and nationality. The notion of intersectionality helps show how each of these concepts constructs a boundary between the locals and the immigrant outsiders. It also explains how the essentialisation of immigrant women is dialectically constituted by these three concepts in their totality (Yuval-Davis 2007: 565) . By dint of their gender alone, all immigrant women are exclusively perceived as wives and mothers by the people of Taiwan. By ethnicity, Southeast Asian immigrant women are seen as inferior other from "strange" cultures. In contrast, Chinese women are considered to be of the "same culture and race" ( , tong wen tong zhong) (e.g., LY 2009: 425 ). Yet, their strangeness is rooted in their PRC nationality: Chinese women are seen as posing a threat to Taiwan's security and democracy, given the antagonism across the Taiwan Strait and the growing sense of Taiwanese identity (Shih 1998; Tseng, Cheng, and Fell 2013: 213-215) . Thus, viewed by intersectionality, immigrant women are wives and mothers whose inferiority is constituted by their inability of using the Chinese language and their ignorance of local ways of life. For Chinese women, the essentialisation of their foreign inferiority is particularly politicised, as it is believed that their socialist upbringing is incompatible with Taiwan's democracy (EY 1990: 15) . Finally, intersectionality is critical for the empirical triangulation as it strengthens the legitimacy of using immigrant women's narratives, which are their subjective understanding of how they are positioned in the multiculturalism discourse by gender, ethnicity and nationality.
Multiculturalism as a National Narrative: The Understanding Taiwan Textbooks Taiwan's claim to multiculturalism, in its descriptive and normative meanings, is cemented in the Additional Articles of the Constitution. Passed in 1997, Article 10 announces that "the State affirms cultural pluralism and shall actively preserve and foster the development of aboriginal languages and cultures" and that "the State shall, in accordance with the will of the ethnic groups, safeguard the status and political participation of the aborigines" (Office of the President, n.a.). Although bi-cultural (Han Chinese and aborigines) in its presentation, the article nevertheless embraces the values of multiculturalism and erects the concept that an ethnic group is a collective unit of the national community, and that the national community is composed of multiple ethnic groups (Chang 2002: 224) . The political context of adopting this article cannot be isolated from the one of educational reforms initiated independently by society in 1994 and the consequential reforms undertaken by the government (Chang 2002: 253-257) . One item on the official reform agenda was to publish a new set of junior high school textbooks focusing on Taiwan and to introduce a new curriculum with which to cultivate students' understanding of the cultures of the "four ethnic groups" (MoE 1996) . Such a curriculum was called for in the wake of the growing demand to replace the monopoly of a China-centred paradigm with a more localised ( , bentuhua) interpretation of the formation of the national community of Taiwan. Such Taiwan-centred historiography was delivered in 1997 by the publication of the Understanding Taiwan textbooks in the subjects of history, geography and social studies (Wang 2005: 70-73) .
As shown in this textbook, the plurality of ethnic composition, which is central to descriptive and normative multiculturalism, is explained away by immigration. That is, the islanders of Taiwan have formed a national community composed of aborigines and the offspring of Han Chinese migrants. The text teaches students that:
Taiwan is an immigrant society. From the Stone Age to the present, people coming here crossed many different times and places. Before the largest number of Han arrived on Taiwan, Aborigines were already here (NICT 1997: 1) […] . Taiwan can be seen as a "multi-ethnic" society (NICT 1997: 6) […] Aborigines, Minnan, Hakka and mainlanders (New Residents) constitute the four ethnic groups of Taiwanese society (NICT 1997: 8) […] The [existence of the] "four ethnic groups" symbolises the diverse cultures inherited from the ancestors of the contemporary Taiwanese residents. The varying languages, cultures, customs, historical memories of each ethnic group are shared cultural heritages that are worthy of preservation, mutual learning and appreciation (NICT 1997: 8-9 ).
The categorisation of four ethnic groups serves two purposes. On the one hand, it subverts the believed cultural uniformity amongst the people of Taiwan and their subordination to the Chinese nation as a local derivation. By complicating the internal constitution of the islanders, it asserts their difference from the continental Chinese nation, and legitimises their endogenously-grown subjectivity. On the other hand, by recognising the indigenousness of aborigines and elevating the status of Hakka, the categorisation overcomes the previous bipolar strife between the Taiwanese-speaking natives ( benshengren) and the Mandarin-speaking mainlanders. Arising from the plurality of the constituent ethnic groups is recognition, tolerance and respect for each group (Chang 2002: 244-246) .
Although the multiculturalist content was controversial in 1997 (Wang 2005: 73-87) , this immigration-themed multiculturalism has gained bi-partisan currency in election campaigns since the mid1990s. In February 1996, Lee Teng-hui (Li Denghui), the incumbent KMT candidate, in his presidential election TV debate, argued:
Everyone knows that Taiwan is an immigrant society. Our aboriginal compatriots are the earliest inhabitants. Except that, everyone else is the offspring of those who migrated from China a long time ago, despite their different time of arrival. Everyone was born and bred in this land. Generation after generation we toiled the soil of Taiwan. Taiwan has become a community of life shared by all of us (cited by Jiang 1997: 85).
In late 2001, a month before the general election, DPP President Chen Shui-bian (Chen Shuibian) repeated that the ROC is a state of "multi-ethnic and plural cultures" and that "multiculturalism is a fundamental national policy" (cited by Chang 2002: 223) . Developed by the demand for shedding the dominance of Chinese identity (Hughes and Stone 1999: 986) , this state-sponsored national narrative of multiculturalism aimed to forge a new Taiwanese identity. As portrayed by this national narrative, common memories and shared destiny have nurtured a sense of belonging -coined as the "New Taiwanese Consciousness" (Lee 1999: 6) -to a new Taiwanese national community that thrives on the multicultural components. Thus, multiculturalism is, in effect, an inward-looking nation-building project that juxtaposes China as the other and aims to foster a new national identity (Chun 2002: 104-105; Hsia 2013: 141) . Whilst China is juxtaposed as the other, Chinese immigrants are excluded from the national community. As analysed later, this exclusion is achieved in the two parties' election publicity by making them invisible; in the legislation, the exclusion is achieved by making it difficult for Chinese people to apply for Taiwanese citizenship.
The Understanding Taiwan textbooks were discontinued in 2002. This was because, as part of the educational reform (MoE 1996) , the provision of textbooks was liberalised and the Ministry of Education no longer enjoyed the monopoly of editing and supplying textbooks for primary and secondary education. Nevertheless, for reasons unknown, the DPP government renewed its text in January 2007 and the completed revision was published online at the end of February 2008, three months before the KMT returned to office (NICT 2008: Preface) . The historical migration that defines multiculturalism appears in the last chapter of the Social Studies Series. Entitled "Building A New Taiwan", this chapter again promotes the multiculturalist national narrative that is interweaved by immigration: Although our forebears came from different places, we now live together; although our ancestors had different historical experiences, we share common historical memories. You and I speak different mother tongues, but we have already had a common language.
[…] Plural cultural heritages and the common historical past have become our shared identity (NITC 2008: 105) .
Whilst the textbook aims to reinforce national cohesion, the inwardlooking multiculturalism under the DPP's authorship also incorporates non-local elements into the national narrative. In the third section of Chapter 2 (entitled "Ethnic Integration in a New Era"), immigrant women were embraced as constituent members of the society (NICT 2008: 19) . However, the tone of integration swings between expecting their subjective identification with Taiwan and cautioning against the impact that receiving immigrant women could have on the sustainability of economic development. Exclusively perceived as inferior foreign mothers, this gendered role, applied to Chinese as well as Southeast Asian women, was revealed by the statement that their marriage is pursued by the Taiwanese husband for continuing the family lineage. Acknowledging the existence of discrimination towards immigrant women and their children, the text claims that improving the attitudes towards immigrants' children is a task that should not be overlooked. A solution suggested with earnestness is to invest resources and facilities in the education of foreign mothers so that they are enabled to familiarise their pre-school children with the culture of Taiwan and that their children can enjoy quality education resources after going to school ( gu qixu touru jiaoyuziyuan he shebei, jiaoyu waiji muqin, shi qi neng rang xueling qiande ertong qinjin taiwan wenhua, ji er shi qi zai ruxuehou xiangyou youzhi de jiaoyu ziyuan) (NICT 2008: 20) .
The doubt about their motherhood resonates with the eugenics-type tone of the 2006 National Security Report of the second DPP government. The author, the National Security Council, voiced its concerns about "degraded population quality" caused by immigrant women reproducing. The lack of capability for child-rearing was characterised as a national threat to Taiwan's international competitiveness (NSC 2006: 61) . Thus, gender intersects with ethnicity in that the discrimination and exclusion against immigrant women is rooted in Taiwan's pride in the "economic miracle" that is integral to Taiwan's national identity.
Exclusion, as such, is not in tune with the normative multiculturalism discourse. The text does not distinguish Chinese women from their Southeast Asian counterparts. It is the legislation of the prerequisites for citizenship eligibility that not only legally reinforces this intertwined exclusion but also formalises the differences between the two groups (see below).
Multiculturalism in Policy Pronouncement: Party Resolution and Manifestoes
Situated in the multiculturalism discourse that aims to enhance national identity, marriage immigration that brings in foreignness and heterogeneity poses a challenge to the cohesion of the national com-munity. The prospect of foreigners permanently settling in Taiwan would require the two parties to revise the inward-looking multiculturalism discourse and find ways in which to accommodate immigrant outsiders of foreign ethnicity. And both parties did. Immigrants featured, to varying degrees, in the two parties' resolution, manifestos and TV advertisements. Thus, the focus of our investigation is under which category immigrant women are appropriated into the multiculturalism discourse, and, between 2000 and 2012, whether the interlocking of multiculturalism and immigrant women features in election propaganda.
The incorporation of immigrant women into the normative multiculturalism discourse for nation-building is found in the DPP's "One Nation of Multi-ethnicity" ( , zuqun duo yuan, guojia yiti) resolution, which was adopted soon after the 2004 presidential election. Pledge 8 of this resolution claimed that Taiwan is not only the natal home to Aborigines, Hakka and Hoklo, but also a new home to mainlanders and a new world for Foreign New Immigrants. The subjectivity of Taiwan is jointly constructed by all ethnic groups. Each ethnic group is the master of Taiwan; each ethnic group's mother tongue is one of the languages of Taiwan ( , Taiwan budan zaoyi shi yuanzhu minzu, kejiaren he heluoren de yuanxiang, geng yi chengwei waisheng xinzhumin de xinguxiang, waiji xinyimin de xintiandi, Taiwan zhutixing shi you ge zuqun gongtong canyu suo jiangou, ge zuqun doushi Taiwan zhuren, ge zuqun muyu doushi Taiwan de yuyan) (DPP 2004) .
Taking a group approach that derives from the "four ethnic group" construction, the resolution problematically bracketed all immigrant women into a single ethnic group. It did not acknowledge that they are of multiple nationalities and ethnicities, and that there is simply no unified "mother tongue" shared by this diverse immigrant population (see also Hsia 2008: 199-200 for a similar critique). Given that Southeast Asian women are officially designated as "Foreign Spouses" in the legislation and public policy, addressing all immigrant women as "Foreign New Immigrants" in effect wrote off the presence of Chinese immigrants, who occupied two-thirds of the entire immigrant community. Overlooking the presence of Chinese immi-grants seemed logical given the tendency of the national narrative which others China so as to assert Taiwan's subjectivity. This omission resonated with the curtailed attempt of the DPP, in alliance with the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), to slow down awarding citizenship to Chinese immigrants in 2003. As the following analysis shows, the lack of attention to Chinese immigrants is a recurring feature in the DPP's election publicity.
Like the DPP in the 2008 textbook, which included immigrant women as members of the national community and expected their identification with Taiwan, the KMT also embraced immigrant women in its 2007 manifesto (Kuomintang 2007a ). However, the KMT's endorsement that "New Immigrants coming to live in Taiwan means that they are real Taiwanese" (Kuomintang 2007b ) was rendered in the policy area of human rights, indicating the party's view that identity is nurtured by the enjoyment of human rights. This formed the KMT's advocacy in the policy area of human rights, women's rights, education, and social security to create an environment conducive for their subjective identification with Taiwan. Although the KMT's manifesto was not short of employing multiculturalism vocabulary, from a gender perspective, the KMT categorised Chinese immigrants and Southeast Asian immigrants as disadvantaged women (together with aboriginal women, elderly women, single mothers), and called for improvements to their socio-economic rights and reform of citizenship legislation. Children of immigrant mothers were offered additional help for education, family life, and speaking their "mothers' languages" (Kuomintang 2007b , emphasis added). Some of the KMT's advocacy in reforming citizenship legislation was implemented after the party regained power in 2008 (see the following section).
Therefore, although both parties admitted immigrant women as members of the national community, there was a noticeable difference in terms of how each party categorised their membership. Both parties took a gender perspective (viewing them as wives and mothers), but the DPP, as the ruling party, showed discrimination in the 2008 textbook, whereas the KMT, as the opposition party, advocated improving the immigrants' human rights in the 2007 manifesto. The language of multiculturalism was employed in both parties' policy pronouncements. Taking a group approach, the DPP, in the 2004 resolution, treated the female immigrants as a single ethnic group. Consistent with its insistence on promoting the "mother tongue" of ethnic groups, the party did not recognise the internal diversity within the immigrant community. In contrast to the DPP's side-lining Chinese immigrants, the KMT in 2007 employed an individualist approach and a gender perspective that enabled them to bypass the thorny issue of defining the position of Chinese immigrants in the national community. Without labelling immigrant women as a single ethnic group, the KMT argued for the right for immigrant children to speak their mothers' languages, which was an indication of its acknowledgement of the multicultural makeup of the immigrant population.
After losing power in 2008, the DPP revised its multiculturalism discourse and immigration policy in the 2010 "Ten-Year Policy Guidelines" ( , shi nian zhenggang) in the run-up to the 2012 presidential election (DPP 2010a (DPP , 2010b (DPP , 2010c . Unlike the 2004 resolution, which regarded all immigrant women as the fifth ethnic group, the guidelines, in the policy area of ethnicity, placed immigrant spouses and foreign labour in the context of demographic imbalance and economic restructuring and regarded both as "New Immigrants". The existence of New Immigrants made the party recognise that the conventional four-ethnic-group concept could not address the complexity of ethnic relations within the national community (DPP 2010b). Besides being included in the policy area of ethnicity, "New Immigrants" also appeared in the area of social welfare. The ethnic policy aimed to help immigrants "adapt to the mainstream society and identify with the nation of Taiwan" (DPP 2010b), whereas the social welfare policy pledged to "build a new multicultural society centred on New Immigrants" and nurture their children to become "new citizens" of this multicultural nation (DPP 2010c). Whilst pursuing their identification, the ethnic policy considered New Immigrants' cultural heritages as important for enriching Taiwan's cultural resources and pledged to improve the rights of immigrant women and their children to education, employment, healthcare, and community participation (DPP 2010b) . This guidelines showed that the DPP continued to conceptualise immigrant women's membership of the national community along the line of ethnicity as well as gender. Although both the KMT and DPP recognised the importance of their socio-economic rights, the KMT framed the issue as that of human rights, whereas the DPP viewed it in the context of ethnicity. As the guideline made strong references to Southeast Asian women, it can be argued that it again avoided including the Chinese into the national community.
The above review demonstrates that the two parties' stances were largely influenced by how they categorised immigrant women's membership of the national community. Drawing from the same normative multiculturalism discourse, both parties pursued immigrants' subjective identification with Taiwan. Whilst both parties regarded immigrant women as wives and mothers -as they had done in their election advertisements (see below) -the DPP was more influenced by a group approach that stressed collective ethnic membership of the national community. In contrast, the KMT leaned towards individual membership that was defined by gender.
In the following section, we look at the two parties' election campaign and examine how they portray immigrant women in the TV advertisements. Our main interest is in whether immigrant women are projected in a way that conforms to the normative multiculturalism discourse.
Multiculturalism in Election Propaganda: TV Advertisements in 2008 and 2011-2012
Considering the scale of marriage migration to Taiwan, it would seem likely that migration would be one of the most contested electoral issues. However, a review of TV election advertisements since the early 1990s shows that the issue did not receive widespread electoral coverage until 2008 (Fell 2013) . Nevertheless, the focus of the 2008 advertisements was not on marriage migration or multiculturalism, but on the imagined consequences of permitting Chinese labour migration. In contrast to its omission of Chinese immigrants in 2004, a series of DPP ads in 2008 centred on the potential impact of Chinese labour migration to Taiwan. These ads warned that if the KMT fulfilled its pledge to create a "One-China Common Market", Chinese labourers would swamp Taiwan. Another ad warned that if Ma Yingjeou (Ma Yingjiu) won, Taiwanese would have to compete for jobs with 200 million members of the Chinese workforce. A number of ads reminded voters that Ma advocated recognising Chinese education qualifications. The core message of these ads was, "If Ma Yingjeou wins, will you be able to keep your job?" ( ?, Ruguo Ma Yingjiu dangxuan, ni neng baozhu fanwan ma?) Therefore, the message coming out of the DPP was highly reminiscent of the British National Party's appeal for "British Jobs for British Workers". The debate arising from the imagined Chinese labour migration suggests that when migration potentially destabilised the local job market, multiculturalism gave way to economic nationalism. The invisibility of Chinese women in the TV ads is in stark contrast to the discriminatory comments of one DPP candidate. On the eve of the 2008 presidential election, the DPP candidate Frank Hsieh (Xie Changting) suggested that Taiwanese men stop being "pigs" by marrying Chinese women because they were "cheap" (Taipei Times 2008). Long Yongru, a Chinese wife interviewed in March 2009, was still full of anger when she recalled Hsieh's sexist slur. In hindsight, this incident seemed to suggest that the DPP intended to mobilise their supporters by magnifying their exclusion of Chinese immigrants (and their Taiwanese husbands), and that this exclusion was continued in 2012 in their disengagement with Chinese immigrants in the party's "Ten-Year Policy Guidelines".
In 2008, it was the KMT that saw the instrumental value of immigrant women for driving home their partisan message. In the 2008 elections, for the first time, immigrant women featured in an ad, which refuted the DPP's initiative to hold a referendum on returning KMT party assets to the state on the same day as the January 2008 legislative election. In this ad, a confused-looking Taiwanese motherin-law stood in front of a notice board about the DPP-backed referendum and was helped by her foreign daughter-in-law, who explained in perfect Mandarin that the DPP was tying the referendum to the election and that they should boycott. This ad projected a Southeast Asian woman who not only reasoned well in Chinese but was also familiar with partisan politics. The KMT unmistakably capitalised on the immigrant women's role as a daughter-in-law. The KMT's other ad in 2008 attempted to undermine its opponent's attack on Chinese labour migration. Stressing that Chinese labour was not allowed to enter Taiwan, this ad tried to convince voters that the DPP's warning was groundless. The ad suggested that the KMT's response to immigration was also framed in economic nationalism rather than multiculturalism.
After being a messenger for the KMT's boycott of 2008 referendum, immigrant women entered the fray in their own right in the combined presidential and legislative elections in 2012. The combination of historical and contemporary multiculturalism appeals was evident in the KMT's 2011 "Happy Reunion Song" ad ( , huan ju ge pian). The Happy Reunion Song has been used by the KMT and Ma in election ads since the late 1990s. It blends Taiwanese and Hakka lyrics with an aboriginal chorus and sends the message that, regardless of ethnic background, the people of Taiwan are all one happy multicultural family, which is now joined by new members. The ad showed a cheerful-looking Taiwanese husband, his Vietnamese wife, and their child outside a Vietnamese restaurant. In line with its 2007 policy manifesto, this KMT ad clearly played the tune of normative multiculturalism, which embraced immigrant outsiders in their gendered roles as wives and mothers.
The KMT's emphasis on gender and subjective identification was especially visible in a series of ads shown on the party's website under the title "Diverse and Tolerant Taiwan" ( , duoyuan baorong Taiwan qing). In one such ad, a half-French, halfDominican woman called Leinisi ( ) showed how she learnt to cook traditional Hakka cuisine and became a neighbourhood head ( , linzhang). The emphasis on her subjective identification was projected as layering her cultural, gender and national identities when Leinisi announced "I am a Hakka daughter-in-law, I am Taiwanese, I am a citizen of the ROC". Her French-Dominican heritage was not mentioned.
Immigrant women also featured in DPP ads in 2012. In the "New Immigrants" ad ( , xin yimin pian), a Vietnamese mother talks to her daughter as they make Vietnamese spring rolls. The narration is entirely in Vietnamese, a first for a Taiwanese election ad. The Vietnamese-language narration fulfilled the DPP's pledge to respect immigrants' cultural rights, as spelled out in the 2010 Guidelines. The subtitles showed that the DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen (Cai Yingwen) advocated friendly policies towards New Immigrants, such as better employment training and placement, and encouraging mothers to pass on their own languages and cultures to their children. Viewed by intersectionality, this advertisement reinforced the role of immigrant women as a foreign mother, and its projection of Vietnamese women as representing New Immigrants again underlines the invisibility of Chinese immigrants in the multiculturalism discourse.
In sum, it is clear that both parties' election ads avoided featuring Chinese immigrant women. Instead, they contested the non-existent Chinese labour migration, and their core message was framed along economic nationalism. When foreign women appeared in their ads, both parties converged on gender and presented them as wives, mothers and daughters-in-law, as they did in their manifestos (see above). However, they differed in their projection of multiculturalism. The KMT stressed harmony and capitalised on immigrants' subjective identification with Taiwan, while DPP highlighted difference and used the Vietnamese narration to convey its commitment to respecting immigrants' cultural heritage.
Multiculturalism in Citizenship Legislation
Under the watch of the DPP (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) and KMT (2008 KMT ( -2012 , the number of immigrants granted citizenship rose steadily. The examination of citizenship legislation provides a timely way to scrutinise multiculturalism policies. Our examination will shed light on how the incumbent government managed the ethnic heterogeneity embodied by immigrants and how this heterogeneity challenged the task of nation-building. The central question is whether the two parties' lawmaking record conforms to their publicised adherence to normative multiculturalism values as shown in their party resolution, manifestoes and TV advertisements. While answering this question, we will point out why Chinese immigrants are made invisible in the election publicity.
The legislation comprises three key laws: the Immigration Act, the Nationality Act, and the Act Governing the Relationship between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and Mainland Area (conventionally known as the Cross-Strait Act). The first two laws apply to Southeast Asian immigrants, whereas the Chinese are covered by the CrossStrait Act. Promulgated in 1992 under the KMT government, the Cross-Strait Act creates a special legal status for PRC citizens; that is, People of the Mainland Area. This was done to address, if not solve, the constitutional ambiguity that PRC citizens are ROC nationals but not citizens. In effect, this status is neither foreign nor domestic (Chen 1994: iii) ; they are in-between. The three laws facilitate a differentiated legal framework for citizenship eligibility. As foreign nationals, Southeast Asian immigrants acquire citizenship via naturalisa-tion. Being on a "neither foreign nor domestic" status, Chinese immigrants acquire citizenship by domicile. That is, after they are permitted to reside in Taiwan for a required period of time, they are awarded citizenship (Tseng, Cheng, and Fell 2013: 208-209) . Nothing else is clearer than their "neither foreign nor domestic" status and the differentiation of the legislation whereby Chinese immigrants are placed in a peculiar position in the national community. By spelling out the requirements for citizenship eligibility, the DPP has become perceived as being hostile towards immigrant women, despite espousing multiculturalism. After 2008, the KMT not only moderated most of these requirements but also deviated from the guiding principle of differentiation, which was its own initiative in 1992.
One of the DPP's initiatives was, in 2003, to inaugurate entry clearance interviews for Chinese women at the port of entry and collect their fingerprints. From 2005 onwards, measures for interviewing foreign spouses for visa applications at Taiwan's overseas missions were also strengthened (MOFA 2007) . Grounded in a gender bias, both measures aimed to detect bogus marriages, deter human trafficking, and curb illegal employment disguised by marriage. Also grounded in a gender bias, immigrant women's residency hinged on the maintenance of their marriage and motherhood. In other words, if they became divorced, they faced deportation unless they had proof that they were victims of domestic abuse or had acquired guardianship of their children born in wedlock (Cheng 2013: 164) . These regulations were inherited by the KMT after 2008, but fingerprint collection was modified in October 2012 and fingerprint collection would only apply to Chinese spouses who enter Taiwan for the first time (MAC 2012) .
The hallmark of DPP's hostility towards immigrant women, as shown in Understanding Taiwan textbook and magnified by the National Security Report, is most evident in citizenship eligibility regulations. In April 2004, the requirement of ensuring financial self-sufficiency was clearly laid out as meaning large monthly income or annual savings (Cheng 2013: 165) . This was criticised as setting up a price for citizenship (Liao 2006: 104) or, in the words of Ellie, a Filipino woman who worked at a piggery, "If you want to have [citizenship] , you must earn money" (Interview 2 2010). In late 2008, in line with its 2007 policy manifesto which pledged to improve immigrant women's human rights, the KMT government dropped this amount-specific threshold but accepted any documentation of their family finances. The DPP's most significant deviation from its 2004 pledge that "each ethnic group's mother tongue is one of the languages of Taiwan" is to make Chinese language ability a prerequisite for citizenship eligibility in 2005. An equivalent option is to pass, either in written or oral form, the Test of Basic Language Abilities and Knowledge of Rights and Duties of Naturalised Citizens. This requirement is universally applied to all citizenship applicants. However, the DPP government made it clear in the draft bill that enhancing an immigrant mother's ability to care for and educate her children was one of the goals behind its introduction (EY 2005) . The language requirement was inherited by the KMT government after May 2008. This shared emphasis on Chinese language ability underlies that when motherhood is considered as an instrumental means of transmitting national culture and safeguarding national identity, both parties prioritised assimilation over multiculturalism.
As noted above, Chinese immigrants were side-lined in both parties' TV advertisements. This reflects the othering of China in the national narrative and the two parties' caution against Chinese immigration. Under the KMT's governance, between 1992 and 1999, Chinese immigrants were exceptionally politicised. In the 1990 draft bill of the Cross-Strait Act, PRC citizens were described as being "contaminated" by communism and were imagined as agents of the PRC's "united front" strategy (EY 1990: 3) . These suspicions persisted even after they became ROC citizens because, being under the Chinese Communist control for a long time, they are not used to the democratic political system and need a certain period of adaptation (EY 1990: 15) .
Thus, the road to citizenship was a winding one; while the required length of residency was four years, the waiting time for citizenship approval could go up to 11-12 years because of the annual cap on the number of citizenships granted (Chen 1997: 5-11, 8-6, 9-4; Tseng, Cheng, and Fell 2013: 208-209) .
In October 2002, two months after President Chen announced "One Country on Each Side" as the defining formula for the TaiwanChina relationship, the Mainland Affairs Council, with Tsai Ing-wen as its chair, submitted to the Legislative Yuan the amendment of the Cross-Strait Act, which prolonged the qualifying period to 11 years in order to stem the awarding of citizenship to Chinese immigrants (Chao 2005) . The DPP government made it clear that the amendment was driven by China's reluctance to denounce the use of force against Taiwan and its persistent reluctance to recognise Taiwan as a de facto independent entity in international society (EY 2002: 36) . Allied with the TSU, DPP legislators argued that Chinese immigrants' loyalty towards China would erode Taiwan's sovereignty and their political inclination towards the pro-unification KMT would tilt voting shares in a way that would eventually compromise Taiwan's independence. The arguments were summed up by TSU's slogans, such as "Taiwanese First", "Save Taiwan" and "Prevent Chinese Brides' Annexation of Taiwan" (Lin 2005: 68; Chang 2004: 89-90) . In the end, neither amendment was passed. What the DPP government did succeed in doing, however, was to restructure the qualifying period to eight years, and Chinese immigrants were also asked to present evidence of financial sufficiency for citizenship eligibility (MAC 2009; Tseng, Cheng, and Fell 2013: 215) .
As advocated in its 2007 manifesto for improving immigrants' human rights, the KMT undertook the reform of citizenship legislation in June 2009, after having abolished the annual cap on the number of citizenships granted in January of the same year (LY 2009: 422-423) . Stressing that Taiwan has always been an immigrant society (LY 2009: 424) , the KMT government shortened the qualifying period for citizenship eligibility to six years. The requirement to prove financial sufficiency was firstly moderated to accept any documentation that showed receipt of incomes, and was subsequently abolished in June 2009 (MAC 2009) . The retention of a longer qualifying period than that required of Southeast Asian immigrants (four years) highlighted the continuity that citizenship legislation was differentiated towards Chinese and foreign immigrants, a necessity that has been said to be aligned with "social concerns from the grassroots level" about Chinese immigration in general and the existence of bogus marriage in particular (LY 2009: 451) . This continuity reflects the reluctance of both parties to embrace Chinese immigrants as citizens.
In late 2012, the KMT finally bowed to the criticism that the differentiated legal framework breached the principle of equality amongst Chinese and Southeast Asian immigrants. In November, a draft bill of amending the Cross-Strait Act was submitted to the Legislative Yuan. If passed, the bill would equalise the requirements for citizenship eligibility for Chinese and Southeast Asian immigrants.
That is, not only would the qualifying period of residency be four years, but Chinese immigrants would also have to pass a test of the knowledge of ROC nationals' rights and obligations (EY 2012) . Nevertheless, the celebrated equality may be superficial if scrutinised by intersectionality. That is, whilst the motherhood of Southeast Asian women is the focus of the language requirement (EY 2005) , Chinese immigrants remain essentialised as being alien to Taiwan's political system and, therefore, their expected assimilation is that of adopting the "values of democracy, civil society and pluralism" (EY 2012) .
In sum, the above review of citizenship legislation shows change and continuity under the auspices of the DPP and KMT governments. The DPP government in 2000-2008 initiated a package of restrictive legislation that was not in tune with its publicised normative multiculturalist stance. After 2008, the KMT government reformed the legislation on the basis of improving immigrant women's human rights. However, both governments shared the fundamental interest of consolidating nation-building. Therefore, the requirement of possessing Chinese language ability conveys both parties' ethnocentric nationalist inclination and their use of immigrant women's motherhood as an instrument for ensuring the transmission of the national culture. In concluding the previous section on election TV ads, we pointed out the critical absence of Chinese immigrants. This omission is partly explained in our analysis of the citizenship legislation. Chinese immigrants fall under a more rigid set of regulations for citizenship eligibility because of the believed incompatibility of their socialist upbringing with Taiwan's democracy. Although the KMT intended to equalise the legal treatment for all immigrant women, the fact that the Chinese must acquire knowledge of "democracy, civil society and pluralism" shows that their essentialisation is different than that of their Southeast Asian counterparts. The intersectionality of gender, ethnicity and nationality reveals how normative multiculturalism discourse gives priority to ethnocentric nation-building. Okin (1999) rang a warning bell that multiculturalism may be bad for women if gender-based practices are accepted as essential to the collective rights of ethnic minority groups. In the case of Taiwan, multiculturalism that is tasked with achieving national cohesion is not particularly beneficial for immigrant women. This multiculturalism prioritises foreign women's expedience for forging national identity for the host nation and falls short of legally recognising their cultural rights. Politi-cising Chinese immigrants and treating them as a threat presents a further impediment for them to be included in the national community.
Multiculturalism in Everyday Life: Immigrant Women's Lived Experiences
As Wise and Velayutham (2009) argued, multiculturalism can be embedded in everyday life experiences. Our fieldwork demonstrates that multiculturalism is not just a top-down discourse that is unilaterally authored by the state or utilised by the political parties. It is also actively invoked by some immigrant women for asserting their equality and defending their cultural autonomy. As the interviews were conducted in March-June 2009, they are a timely reflection upon the change and continuity of the citizenship legislation that occurred after 2008.
As analysed above, the inward-looking multiculturalist national narrative regards China as the other. Under this narrative, both political parties gendered Chinese immigrants as wives/mothers and politically essentialised them as a threat to Taiwan. On the other hand, projecting them as wives/mothers whose human rights were impeded, the KMT liberalised citizenship legislation. For Chinese immigrants, the immigration-themed multiculturalism proved to be not only a source of alienation from the host Taiwanese society but also one that offers inclusion and equality. To subvert the intertwined image of threat and wives/mothers, Zhang Jinhua, a self-styled activist taking part in Chinese women's rights claim movement, argued that "marriage has nothing to do with politics" (Interview 3 2009). Granny Yang, a 71-year-old retired chemical engineer, argued that although both the KMT and the DPP were reluctant to receive Chinese immigrants, they were driven by different senses of threats towards China: the KMT was anti-communist, the DPP anti-China (Interview 4 2009). Tong Hongying, a 28-year-old shop assistant, attributed the DPP's hostility to the party's fear that the political inclination of Chinese immigrants would tilt the delicate equilibrium of support for independence and unification (Interview 5 2009). To resist alienation arising from politicisation, the narratives of Hu Hailan, a 57-year-old retiree, invoked the multiculturalism discourse for inclusion:
Hakka people are originally from the Mainland, so are the Hoklo, but they don't admit their ancestral roots now. […] In fact, we're the same. We came from other places but live in the same land now. Why should we distinguish between each other? (Interview 6 2009).
Hailan was joined by Lou Yingzhu, another retiree, who stated: "In this island, except aborigines, everyone is from other places" (Interview 6 and 7 2009). These narratives showed that, depending on who was interpreting the national narrative, the discourse could be either exclusionary, when the emphasis was on safeguarding the subjectivity of Taiwan, or accommodating, when the focus was on the historicity of Chinese migration to Taiwan.
The normative multiculturalism that respects cultural differences also renders agency to Vietnamese women. Pursuing her postgraduate study while being a full-time mother, Hӗ Minh Mai refuted the assimilation pressure embedded in the prerequisite of Chinese language ability for citizenship eligibility. She defended her right to speak Vietnamese with her children and with other Vietnamese immigrants. Dissatisfied with a diminished mother-child intimacy caused by speaking the alien Chinese languages, as well as the loss of her cultural heritage (Cheng 2013: 169) , Minh Mai denounced the ethnocentric pressure as "cultural colonialism" and appealed to the normative multiculturalism, as follows:
Language is an important tool for identification. When Vietnamese talk to Taiwanese, they should speak the common language for communication, which is Chinese. But when two Vietnamese are speaking to each other, there's no need to speak Chinese. I'm Vietnamese, they [pointing at her children] are the children of a Vietnamese. Why on earth I should speak to them in another language? A lot of Taiwanese [parents-in-laws] forbid Vietnamese mothers from speaking Vietnamese to their children. This is inviting trouble for the family. These kinds of family problems will lead to social problems. […] In fact, Taiwan has always been multicultural for the past four hundred years (Interview 8 2009).
As the Chinese found legitimacy for inclusion in the multiculturalism discourse, Minh Mai also found support for recognition of difference. What Minh Mai elaborated was to intersect ethnicity with gender and draw a line between the public and private. That is, as a member of society, she agreed with the need to speak local languages in public.
However, in private amongst Vietnamese and particularly in the home, speaking Vietnamese between the mother and the child is a right for them and a tool for passing down her Vietnamese identity. Defying the ethnocentric accusation that the inadequate Chinese language ability of immigrant women impaired their motherhood, Minh Mai argued that it is the very deprivation of speaking the "mother's tongue", rather than the inability to speak Chinese, that caused social problems. Minh Mai's articulation elucidates that whilst the host state attempted to utilise gender for assimilation, immigrant mothers also exploited the notion of gender and debased the pressure of assimilation. The private sphere, defined by activities undertaken by individuals such as the parent-child relationship or interaction between co-ethnics, should be reserved for practising multiculturalism in everyday life.
In the spirit of locating everyday multiculturalism practice, Voyer argues that the language of multiculturalism may be used by individuals to construct their modern identity (2011). In the cases of Hailan and Yingzhu, evoking the vocabulary of the immigration theme of multiculturalism, they acquired an identity that allowed them to claim to be local and demand equality. For them, the identity of a wife/ mother could be the source of relief from politicisation and empowerment for demanding cultural autonomy sanctified by multiculturalism.
Conclusion
In this study, we have presented a preliminary yet thorough examination of Taiwan's claims to multiculturalism before and after 2008. By reviewing the content of the Understanding Taiwan textbooks, the two political parties' election campaigns, and the citizenship legislation inaugurated by the two governments, we have identified change and continuity. The change and continuity was further reflected upon by Chinese and Vietnamese interviewees.
Our findings show that multiculturalism has become a primary discourse for nation-building. In the past decade, this discourse has been extended by the two parties to embrace immigrant women. However, under the gender bias, the DPP's inclusion of immigrant women as members of the national community has been eclipsed by its undetone of eugenics and conceptualising them as a threat to Taiwan's prosperity. Lumping all immigrant women into one single ethnic group, the DPP's 2004 resolution granted them nominal and collective equality with other groups, and this equality was problematically defined by the equality of immigrant women's non-existent representative mother tongue. However, this gesture was nullified in 2005 by the party's legislation demanding Chinese language ability for assimilation and safeguarding national identity. After losing power in 2008, the party argued for the right to speak one's own language and the need to improve socio-economic rights. This changed stance was further visualised in a 2012 TV advertisement that depicted a Vietnamese woman speaking Vietnamese to her daughter.
The change of ruling party in 2008 meant that the KMT had the chance to put in place its advocacy for improving immigrants' human rights. In 2007, while in opposition, the KMT took a gender perspective and conceptualised immigrants as disadvantaged women. Following this line, the party's multiculturalism credentials were enhanced by calling for improving immigrants' socio-economic rights. After regaining power in 2008, the party reformed the citizenship legislation and proposed abolishing the differentiation of citizenship legislation.
In spite of these significant changes, viewed by intersectionality, the legislation before and after 2008 was defined by a continuity of fundamental interests. This is most evident in conceptualising immigrant women's motherhood as instrumental in ensuring Taiwan's international competitiveness and maintaining national identity. Both parties prioritised assimilation over multiculturalism to respect immigrants' cultural rights. This prioritisation is also evident in the continuation of politicising Chinese immigrants and, consequently, both parties have chosen to bypass Chinese immigrants in their election campaign. This invisibility highlights the uneasiness of including Chinese women in the national community. These findings were further triangulated by immigrant women's lived experiences. From a bottom-up perspective, the nationalistic multiculturalism proved a source of alienation as well as inclusion. Intersected by gender, the inadequacy of multiculturalism in granting immigrant women socioeconomic rights was revealed. On the other hand, whilst motherhood was politicised for transmitting the culture of the host nation, it was also utilised by immigrant women to preserve their cultural rights.
Based on these findings, we conclude that the change of ruling party did make a difference in terms of both parties' projection of immigrant women in election propaganda and citizenship legislation. However, as challenged by immigrant women's actual experiences, multiculturalism, as practised in Taiwan, is used by both parties to strengthen the citizens' Taiwanese identity. In this nation-building project, there is nearly no room left for recognising immigrants' cultural heritage. 
